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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to explain why monopolies keep their nominal prices
constant for longer periods than do tight oligopolies. We provide two
possible explanations. The first is based on the presence of a small fixed
cost of changing prices. The second, on small costs of discovering the
optimal price. The incentive to change price for duopolists producing
differentiated products exceeds that of a single monopolistic firm which
produced the same tange of products as the duopoly.
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The relationship between industry structure and pricing is a major
focus of Industrial Organization. One of the most striking facts to have
emerged about this relationship is that monopolists tend to change their
prices less frequently than tight oligoolies. Although the first evidence
in this regard was presented by Stigler (1947) almost forty years ago, no
theoretical explanations have been offered. The objective of this paper is
to develop models capable of explaining these facts.
Stigler's objective in comparing the relative rigidity of monopoly and
duopoly prices was to test the kinked demand curve theory of Hall and Hitch
(1939) and Sweezy (1939). Since the work of Gardiner Means (1935)seemedto
show that concentrated industries exhibited greater price rigidity than their
unconcentrated counterparts, the kinked demand curve was developed and
embraced as providing a theoretical foundation for the rigidity of prices.
It was widely regarded to be an implication of that theory that duopolists
would not change their prices in response to small changes in their costs.'
Stigler's test was a direct and simple test of the rigidity of
oligopoly prices. Instead of comparing oligopoly pricing with pricing in
unconcentrated industries he simply compared the relative rigidity of
monopoly andoligopolyprices. If it is the kink that leads to inflexible
oligopoly prices, monopolists should have more flexible prices since
monopolists do not face a kinked demand curve. Stigler found instead that
monopolist's prices were even more rigid. Several later empirical studies
'This view was emphasized by Bronfenbrenner (1940), forexample. It is now
well—recognized, however, that the kinked demand curve implies multiple
equilibria. When cost conditions change one might well expect the
equilibrium to change as well. It is only if the current price is somehow
"focal" that the price willnotchange.2
have supported his original finding: monopolist's change their prices less
frequently than do oligopolists.
In his study, Stigler tabulated the number of price changes for two
monopolistically supplied commodities (aluminum andnickel)and 19 products
which were each supplied by a small number of firms. The source of the data
on price changes was the Bureau of Labor Statistics bulletins, Wholesale
Prices for the period June 1929 —Nay1937. The price of nickel did not
change at all over this period and there were only two price changes for
aluminum. Among the oligopolistically supplied roaucts, however, only one
had fewer than four price changes (sulphur) and half had more than ten price
changes.
The finding has been replicated on other price data for different
periods. Simon (1969) studied advertising rates of business magazines from
1955 to 1964. Simon's data has the advantage that it contains the price
series for each publication rather than simply an index of the industry
price, as is the case for the BLS data. Simon finds that the average number
of years in which an individual firm's price changes is monotonically
increasing in the number of competitors it has.
Primeaux and Bomball (1974) compare pricing of electric power when it
is supplied by a duopoly versus a monopoly. Their data cover 17 duopolies
and 22 monopolies from 1959 to 1970. One advantage of their study is that
there is no product differentiation in electric power so that there is no
danger of miespecifying the firms' competitors. Also, list prices are
transactions prices since deviations from printed schedules are illegal for
public utilities. Their results show that when there are two firms in the
market they each change their prices more often than a corresponding
monopolist.3
Thisis true for all levels of power usage. The effect is more pronounced
for lower levels of power usage where the duopolists changed their prices
two or three times more frequently than it is for higher power usages where
they change their prices roughly one-and-a-half times as often.
Finally, Primeaux and Smith (1976) study the pricing of 88 major drugs
during the period 1963—1973. For their sample they are unable to reject the
hypothesis that a monopolist changes its price as frequently as each
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individualoligopolist. For the most part the monopoly prices they report
are those for drugs about to go off patent. If monopolists have a tendency
to change their prices in anticipation of the competition that is likely to
ensue when the patent runs out, this might explain why the results here are
weaker than in the cases reported above.
There thus seems to be a general tendency for monopolists to change
their prices less frequently than oligopolists. The explanation that we
offer for this phenomenon is based on the relative incentives of monopolists
and oligopolists to adjust their prices when underlying cost and/or demand
conditions change or when inflation erodes existing prices. We focus on the
comparison between duopoly and monopoly and show that whether the products of
the duopoly are homogeneous or differentiated, the duopolists have a greater
incentive to change their prices than does a monopolist facing the same
configuration of demand. So, if there are other forces leading to price
rigidity that are of roughly comparable magnitudes across industry
structures, there will be a general tendency for duopoly prices to change
more frequently. There are a variety of reasons why prices may be
unresponsive to changes in underlying conditions. We focus on two. The
first reason is that there may be a fixed cost of changing prices. This idea
was first put forward by Barro (1972) and has been used by Sheshinski and4
Weiss(1979, 1985), Rotemberg (1982), and Mankiw (1985) among others. These
costs are usually taken to include the physical costs of changing and
disseminating price lists and the possibility of upsetting customers with
frequent price changes. In the electric utility industry they also capture
the costs of obtaining permission from regulatory authorities for changing
tariffs. The second reason is that while firms may be aware that underlying
conditiori have changed, it may be costly for them to ascsrtai'nprecisely how
they have changed. For example, on the demand side, market research may be
required to discover true deriand, sales data may need to be analysed, or
salepeoples' opinions canvassed and aggregated. On the cost side, labor and
material costs may have to be reestimated. At least when it is believed that
only moderate changes in conditions have occurred, firms may then prefer not
to change their prices to incurring these costs. Of course, absent a fixed
cost to changing prices as well, this would only explain the reluctance of
firms to change prices when their best estimate of the optimal price given
the information they have is the current price itself.
Given the general reluctance of firms to change their prices, the
question then is how the gains to the firms of changing their prices compare
with the costs, and more importantly, how the gains differ accross market
structures. To see why duopolists in general have a greater incentive to
change prices, consider the following simple case. Suppose that two firms
competing in Bertrand style and charging price equal to constant marginal
cost unexpectedly discover that costs have increased. If neither firm
increases its price, the firms share the loss of supplying the entire market
demand at a price below costs. The firms obviously have a large incentive
to change their prices. Furthermore, if either firm believes its rival will
change its price then it has an even greater incentive to raise its own price5
in order to avoid suffering the entire loss itself. Putdifferently,
when a firm changes its own price it imposes a negative externality on its
rival: it increases the amount that the firm must sell at the 'wrong" price.
A similar phenomenon arises for cost decreases. In that case there is
no incentive for the firms to make a combined price decrease. However there
are substantial incentives for either firm to make a unilateral price
decrease to undercut the rival. Here again there is an externality: the
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deviatingfirm's gain is made at the rival's expense.
Amonopolist's profits aredifferentiable in its price. Therefore, as
Akerlofand Yellen(1985) show, the loss in profits from not changing its
price is second order. Since the duoj.olist's incentives to change price are
first order, if they face comparable costs of changing prices, the duopolists
would change price more frequently than a monopolist would.
When oligopolists produce differentiated products individual firm's
profits are again differentiable in their ownpricesand the Akerlof—Yellen
argument still applies. Onemightbelieve, therefore, that the result that
monopolists change their prices less frequently than duopolists would not
hold inthiscase. We show that it does. The reason has to do with the
externalities discussed above.
Consider duopolists producing differentiated products and, as above,
suppose that costs increase slightly. Now if one firmraisesits price
slightly it no longer yields all of its customers to its rival. Profits are
no longer discontinuous at the point of equal prices. However, it does lose
some of its customers to its rival, and if the degree of substitutability is
high it loses them at a rapid rate. In other words, the externality that the
duopolist inflicts on its rival is increasing in the degree of
substitutability between the products. Thus although the increase in profits
from adjusting its price is second order, it may belarge. A monopolist,6
on the other hand, is able to internalise these externalities. For purposes
of comparison, suppose that the monopolist offers both products. Now when it
changes the price of either one it bears the full consequences: both the
change in profits of the product whose price is changed and that of the
product whose price is unchanged. Whereas the duopolists each have an
incentive to change prices in order to make a gain at the other's expense,
the nionoplist has no such incentive.
I'
Thusin the presence of fixed costs of changing prices the monopolist
may adjust prices more sluggishly. In order to compare the relative
frequency of price adjustments, it is important not to stack the deck against
the monopolist by having it incur a fixed cost for changing each of its
prices. Rather, to bias the conclusion away from our result we suppose that
the monopolist can change both of its prices for what it costs each of the
duopolists to do so. Even then we find that provided the cross—elasticity of
substitution is high enough, the duopolists change their prices more
frequent ly.
Sinilar motives tend to make duopolists more keen to discover changes
in underlying cQnditions when discovery is costly. For example, if one firm
discovers that costs have fallen it is able to exploit that information at
the expense of its rival by lowering its price and attracting its rival's
customers. Alternatively if it discovers that costs have increased it is
able to increase its price and the rival suffers from having a large demand
at an unremunerative price. These incentives do not apply to monopolists:
they can therefore afford to be "lazy" in their collection of information.
We begin by examining the case of a fixed cost to changing prices. In
Section II we develop intuition via a homogeneous goods example. This model
is generalized to differentiated products and an inflationary environment in7
Section III. In section IV we study the case where it is costly to discover
the exact magnitude of a change in costs. We conclude with Section V.
II. A Model with Homogeneous Products and Fixed Costs of Changing Prices
In order to demonstrate how the incentives for a monopoly to change
prices differ from those of a duopoly we begin with a very simple model. In
particular, we will assuiae that the duopolists produce a homogenous good with
I. constantmarginal costs and compete in prices a la Bertrand. As we shall see
below, this formulation is useful for expository purposes since the
incentives for changing prices are most apparent when the model is stripped
down in this way.
Unfortunately, we will also see that this formulation is too stark in
the sense that duopolists earn zero profits given of any fixed costs. Thus,
they must bear any such costs, their participation becomes unprofitable.
However, any number of modifications in the direction of realism (such as
differentiated products or increasing marginal costs) would provide the firms
with sufficient profits to cover small fixed costs. We begin with the
simplest model and later show how product differentiation guarantees the
willingness of the firms to participate.
Time is divided into two "periods" by an unexpected increase in the
firms' constant marginal costs of production fromc. to c2. We will refer to
the periods before and after the cost change as periods 1 and 2 respectively.
Inverse demand is given by P=a—bQ, a>c2. Since the duopolists compete in
Bertrand style P =P
=
c1(subscripts denote firms and the firm is indexed
by the superscript). The monopolists, on the other hand, changes P =
(a-s-c1)/2and sells (a—c1)/2b.8
We explore how the change in costs affects prices. We consider what
happens when the new level of marginal costs, c2, is known to both firms
before they select their period two prices, but where each firm must incur a
a fixed cost, f, to change its price.





c2)(2b•If,on the other hand, it changes its price,
it earns (a—c2)2/4b —f.It is therefore worthwhile to change price if and
only if
(c —c)2 > f
4b
Now consider a dopolist. The amount demanded at P=c1 is qE (a—c1)/b.
Suppose that firm 2 does not change its price. If firm 1 doesn't change its
price either the firms share the loss of q.1(c2—c1) i.e. they each lose (a—
c1)(c2—c1)/2b. What happens if firm 1 increases its price? To do so it must
incur the cost, f, and then it goes out of business. Thus firm 1 loses f if
it raises its own price and firm 2 keeps its price unchanged. So firm 1
prefers to change its price if
(a—c2)(c2—c1)/2b > f. (2)
Now consider what happens if firm 2 increases its price to c2. Now firm
1 loses (a—c2)(c2—c1)/b if it maintains its period one price (since it now
bears the entire loss itself). On the other hand it loses only f, if it
joins firm 2 in the price increase to c2Thus it prefers to raise its price
if
(a—c2)(c2—c1)/b > f (3)
Equation(2) implies equation (3).Thusif (2) holds, changing price is9
a dominant strategy and the unique equilibrium involves both firmschanging
price, if (3) holds but (2) does not, each firm is willing to change its
price only if the other also does. There are then two equilibria:one in
which the firms both change their prices and one in which neither does.
Finally, if (3) does not hold then the unique equilibrium is that neither
firm changes its price.
Now compare the relative incentives for the duopoly and themonopol to
change prices. To make the comparison unfavorable to frequent price changes
by the duopoly, we concentrate on the case in which changing price is the
unique equilibrium. Then the duopoly changes prices if (2) holds while the
monopoly changes prices if (i) holds. Since a> (c1+c2)/2 by assumption, if
(1) holds then (2) holds as well. Thus the duopolists wouldalways change
the price if the monopolist would. IIoreover, if
(a—c2)>2bf/(c2—c1)>(c2—c)/2
then (2) holds but (1) does not so that, for parameters in thisrange, the
duopolists would change their prices whereas the monopolist would not.
The intuition for these results is clear from Figure 1 which illustrates
the effect of a cost increase. The profit for amonopolist who sets the
optimal price for costs c2 is given by the integral of marginal revenue minus
marginal costs evaluated at q which equals the shaded area in Figure 1. If
the monopolist doesn't change it's price (so that it sells q'), itearns the
profits it would earn if its costs were actuallyc1 (the area ac1z) minus
(c2-c1) cj' =c1c2yz.The loss from not changing its price is therefore the









— c1)2/4b.The monopolist is willing to change its price if this area
exceeds f.










change its price, firm 1 can raise it price to c2 and earn zero (less the
fixed cost f). On the other hand, if it doesn't change its price it shares
the industry loss of c1c2vw. Clearly (c1c2vw)/2 always exceeds (xyz). Thus
the duopolist always has a greater incentive to increase its price.
In some sense the result of this section is not suprising since, a
Akerlof and Yellen (1985) argue the cost from not changing one's price is of
second order in the change in costs only if the profits function is
differentiable with respect to price. This is not true for Bertrand
duopolies and indeed (2) is of first order in the change in costs while (1)
is of second order. However, as soon as we let the duopoly produce
differentiated products, the profit functions become differentiable and both
losses are of second order. Yet we show in the following section that as the
two goods become better and better substitutes the analysis in this section
becomes more relevant.
Note that while Bertrand duopolists respond more to changes in costs
they respond less to changes in demand with constant marginal costs the
duopoly never changes its price when a changes. Instead by not changing its
prices the monopolists loses an amount quadratic in the change in a.
This analysis has two shortcomings. First, the duopolists lose money in
equilibrium. If they do change their prices the new equilibrium has P2c2,
but they must incur the fixed cost of changing their prices. If they do not
change their prices, they sell at a price less than marginal cost.
Second, the analysis does not carry over to the case o± a cost decrease.
In that case if both firms change their prices the resulting equilibrium has
P2c2. Thus each firm loses f. So one firm can do better by not changing
its price, selling nothing, and earning zero profits.11
Both ofthese shortcomings are due to the zero—profit nature of Bertrand
competition. We show in the following section that if one allows for some
degree of product differentiation these problems disappear. Although the
incentive for a duopolist to change its price is somewhat dampened with
differentiated products since demand is less responsive to price differences,
we show that duopolists may nonetheless change their prices more frequently
than monopolists.
III. Differentiated Products and Costs of Changing Prices
e consider an industry in which two goods are produced. The demand for
goods 1 and 2 is given by:
1=a/2-(b/2+d)P/S+dP2/St
=a/2—(b/2+d)P/S+dP1/S
where a, b and d are positive constants, S is the general price level and t=1
or 2 denotes the period. As can be seen from equation (5),thetwo goods are
symmetric and d is a measure of their substitutability. The goods can be
produced at constant marginal cost Sic. In this section we focus
particularly on changes in overall prices S since this is probably the main
reason for price changes in the studies mentioned in the introduction. Note
that increases in S do not just raise costs, as in the previous section, but
also increase the quantity demanded at any price. This occurs because any
given price now represents a smaller amount of real purchasing power.
Therefore, profits deflated by Sfrom producing good 1, 4aregiven by:
4= [a/2-(b/2+d)P/S+ c) (6)12
and similarly for good 2.
If the firms simultaneously choose prices and behave noncooperatively,
firm 1 chooses to maximize (6). The first order condition is
P dP/(b+2d) +aS/(2b+4d)
+cSt/2. (7)
The Nash equilibrium prices in the first period if the firms expect
S1
to be equal to S2 is then:
=
[a+c(b+26)151/2(b+d).




This decomposes into a term incorporating the first order condition (7)
and a term that is independent of P. Now suppose that S changes
unexpectedly from S1to 2 We then ask how bi this change in S has to be in
order to induce the firms to change their prices in the presence of a fixed
cost to changing prices, f.
We first calculate the increase in. firm 1 's profits from changing its
price from P to assuming that firm 2 doesn't change its price (PP).
We will show shortly that this gives a lower bound on the increase in firm







But notice that P will be set equal to the price that maximizes given
that firm 2 is setting P. Using (7), the first term is equal to zero. Thus13
we have
(b/2+d)[P -dP/(b+2d) -aS2/(2b+4d)+cS2/2]2/S. (10)
Using (3) and rearranging this gives
=(S)2(b/2+d)[a/(b+2d) +c]2/4 (ii)
2
where LS is S1—S2.
It is immediate from (io)thatthis gives a lower bound to the chane in
firm l's profits from changing its price. This can be seen by noting that
increases (decreases) in firm 2's price tend to increase (10) when S2
increases (decreases). (To see this notice that a/(2b+4d)>c/2 if the
monopoly price exceeds marginal cost. Also, P =dP/(b+2d) +aS2/(2b+4d)
-
cS2/2.If S2 increases, the RHS of this expression exceeds P. This
difference is increased if P also increases. Similarly, if 2 decreases,
the RJ{S is less than P1 .Thedifference between the LHS and Rx{S is then
increased if P2 is decreased.)
Thus when (ii) exceeds f a duopolist will always change its price.
Compare this with the situation for a monopolist. To bias the argument
against our case we suppose that the monopolist can change both of its prices
if it incurs the cost f. Algebra analogous to that above yields the result
that the increase in a monopolist's profits from changing its price is
(S)2 b[a/b+c]2/4. (12)
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The difference between (12) and (ii), the monopolist's and duopolist's
incentives to change price, is proportional to:
b(a/b+c)2-(b/2+d)(a/(b+2d)+c)2. (13)
The derivative of (13) with respect to d is
[a/(b+2d)]2 —c2
which is negative for d bigger than (a—bc)/2c. A d increases this
derivative converges to the constant —c2 so that, for d sufficiently big,
(ii) exceeds (12) and duopolists change their prices in response to smaller
changes in S. If one considers the example in which a equals 10, c equals 5
and b equals 1, then if d exceeds 7 duopolists will change their prices
whereas the monopolist will not.
We now turn to an interpretation of these results. An increase in S has
two effects. It raises demand and costs at the current price. The
simplified model of the previous section provides the intuition for why the
duopolists have a greater incentive to change their prices in response to a
cost change. With differentiated products, the cost change has an effect
proportional to b on the monopolist's desire to change its price, and an
effect proportional to (b/2+d) on each duopolist. If d is greater than b/2
the latter effect is larger.
Duopolists are less affected by the change in demand on the other hand.
This can be seen by analyzing directly the effect on the incentive to change
prices of changes in a. These have an impact on the desirability of changing
prices proportional to a/4b for the monopolist while the effect on each
duopolist is proportional to a/8(b+2d). Even when d is zero, the effect on
the duopolists is smaller simply because the firms are smaller. As d goes15
up, the duopolist becomes even less concerned until with d=w demand stops
mattering. A higher d means that the demand curve perceived by the duopolist
becomes flatter. This means that any given horizontal translation in demand
leads to smaller gains from changing the price. Suppose the demand goes up
(as it would when S rises). Then a firm with a steep demand would raise its
price substantially gaining large profits from consumers relatively unwilling
to stop purchasing. Instead, firms with very elastic demand curves woulci
raise their prices little and lose substantial customers in the process.
Thus when d is large the demand effect becomes insignificant and the
cost effect becomes paramount. Therefore, for d large, the duopolists are
more willing to change their prices in response to changes in the price level
than monopolists.
These results are broadly consistent with the simulations of Akerlof and
Yellen (1985) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1985). They compute the lost
profits from keeping prices unchanged as a fraction of profits in the former
case and as a fraction of revenues in the latter. Both these papers show
that in response to a small increase in the money supply these fractions are
higher the lower is the elasticity of the demand facing firms. This is
consistent with our paper insofar as our results also depend on duopolists
having flatter perceived demand curves than monopolists. Yet these apparent
similarities mask some important differences. First, comparing only the
elasticity of demand across firms does not take into account that monopolists
are different from individual oligopolists both in that they are larger and
are subject to fewer strategic interactions.2 Second, insofar monopolists
2For instance, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) assume that the fraction of firms
who keep their prices constant (i.e. who are near—rational) is independent of
the structure of demand.16
have higher profits (or revenues) than oligopolists, considering only ratios
of the type studied by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Blanchard and Klyotaki
(1985) tends to make monopolists automatically appear to view fixed prices as
less onerous. Finally, their simulations do not place firms in contexts in




The results in the jirevious sections rely on fixed costs of changing
prices. In this section we show that similar results can be obtained even in
the absence of these costs. In particular, we show that a cost s of learning
the actual value of marginal cost can lead to relative rigidity of monopoly
pricing. Duopolists are Liore likely than monopolists to spend s and ad,just
their price accordingly. This result has the interpretation that monopolists
are "lazy" when it comes to collecting information. As a result, in an
environment in which costs are stochastic and independently distributed over
time, monopolists tend to keep their prices constant while duopolists don't.
While this result shows that the principle that monopolists have less
responsive prices than duopolists does not hinge on costs of changing prices
it is important to remember that the costs considered in this section cannot
explain constant prices in the face of publicly known aggregate price
movements. These movements would induce price changes by both monopolists
and oligopolists as long as these firms recognize that such movements are at
least somewhat correlated with their own costs of production.
We consider again an industry that produces two differentiated products
whose demands are given by (5). We abstract from inflation and normalize S
to equal one. Costs are stochastic and distributed independently in the17
first and second periods. Since this makes tne analysis static we can
consider just one period, say the second one.
Actual cost equal c+c where c is a constant while c is a random




where takes expectations conditional on information available to firm 1
This leads to the following first order condition:
P1 =E[a/2 +dP2
+(b/2+d)(c±E)]/(b+2d) (15)
and similarly for firm 2:
P2 E2[a/2 +
dP+(b/2+d)(c+€)]/(b+2d). (16)
If either firm does not search, one can obtain its (uninformed) price
P by the law of iterated expectations:
[a/2 +(b/2+d)c]/(b+d). (17)
If both firms charge this price expected profits of each equal K which
is given by:
K(b/2+d)(a/2 -bc/2)2/(b-i-d)2.
If firm 2 does not search and firm 1 does, then substituting
from (17) for P2 in (l5Yyields the result that firm 1 charges
Then, substituting this in (14), firm l's expected profits equal:
K +(b/2+d)EE2/4. (is)
So if one of the firms (say firm 2) does not find out the true value of
marginal costs and the variance of e exceeds 4s/(b/2+d), its rival has an
incentive to search. In other words, when the variance of c exceeds
4s/(b/2+d) there is no equilibrium in which neither firm searches.
Suppose firm 1 does search and charge P+c/2. Then substituting this
value of P1 in (16) the optimal price for firm 2 is once again Firm 2's
expected profits are then given by:18
K -dEc2. (19)
As an aside notice that firm 2's profits in (19) are lower than when
neither firm searches. When one firm searches it can charge a high price
when c is high and a low price when c is low. As a result, the other firm
obtains an inordinately large number of customers when costs are high aid few
customers when costs are low leading to large losses in profits.
We now proceed to show that the profits in (19) are so low that itis
not an equilibrium for one firm not to search when the other searches.
Suppose firm 1 searches and charges P-1-c/2. Then, substituting this in (16)
firm 2 would charge P +(b+3d )e/(2b+4d) if it were to search as well. This
would result in profits of:
K +(b+d)2Ee2/8(b+2d). (20)
So the net benefits from searching are equal to the expression in (20)
minus the expression in (19). This equals:
[d +(b+d)2/8(b+2d)]Ec2=[(b/2+4d)/4+d2/8(b+2d)]Ec2
which exceeds (b/2+d)Ec/4, the incentive to search unilaterally when the
other firm does not search.
Having shown that for one firm not to search while the other searches
is not an equilibrium3 we now show that for both firms to search is always an
equilibrium whenever one firm would search unilaterally-. In other words we
show that when the variance of c exceeds 4s(b/2+d) neither firm wants to
deviate from the equilibrium in which both search.
If both firms search andareaware that they both search then the
equilibrium price is P:
P =[a/2+(b/2+d)(c-f-c)]/(b+d)
which leads to profits of:
3Note that we focus only on pure strater equilibria and neglect the
possibility that strategies involve random searching.19
K +b2(b/2+d)EE2/4(b+d)2. (21)
If firm 2 ceases to search but firm 1 continues to charge Pthe n
optimal price for firm 2 becomes P and its expected profits equal:
K -d(b/2+d)Ec2/(b+d) (-22)
Taking the difference between (21) and (22) one obtains the net
benefit to searching given that the other firm searches. This is given
by:
(b/2+d)[b2 /4(b+d)2 +d/(b+d)]Ec2=(b/2+d)(b+2d)2Ec2/4(b+d)2
which, as long as d is positive, exceeds (b/2+d)Ec2/4 the incentive for the
first firm to search unilaterally. Thus if one firm searcnes, the other
always searches as well.
Again to bias our results in favor of finding the oligopolists changing
their prices infrequently, we assume that the duopoly only gathers
information on marginal cost when each firm (taken individually) would want
to do so.
When the two firms are combined in a monopoly, the combined firm
maximizes:
E(P —c-c)(a—bP)
so that its optimal price is given by [a/2b +c/2+Ec/2].Thus if the




If itdoessearch itobtainsexpected profits equal to K +bEe /4.
Thus it only searches if Ec2 exceeds 4s/b where s are the search costs.
Note that this is lower than the profits in (18)obtainedwhen only one firm
searches. Now, firms thatsearchcannot take advantage of the other firm's
unresponsivenessto costs.20
Rememberthat the duopoly searces when Ec2 exceeds 4s/(b/2+d). So, as long
as d exceeds b/2 so that the slope of each duopolists demand curve is flatter
than the monopolist's, the duopoly will always search when the monopolists
does but not viceversa.
V. Conclusions
We have shownthatthe cost from not changing one's price is generlly
lower for monopolists than for members of a tight oligopoly. As a result, in
the two period models we present, circuiiistances which lead a monopolist to
change its prices would always encourage duopolists to do so as well while
the reverse is not true. In this conclusion we point out a few caveats and
possible extensions of the analysis.
First, our analysis has been concerned exclusively with the monopoly—
duopoly comparison. Yet, Canton (1985) as well as Stigler (1947) suggest
that price rigidity is monotonic in concentration so that duopolies change
their prices less often than three firm oligopolies and so on. The anlysis
of this paper can probably be extended to cover these cases as well. What
was crucial in our analysis is that perceived demand curves become flatter as
there are more competitors. This makes price changes more attractive because
some of the benefits derive at the expense of competitors. Insofar as
oligopolists with many competitors can resonably be thought to have
perceived demand curves that are more elastic (because there are better
substitutes produced by competitors for instance), they will change their
prices more frequently.
Second, our analysis of the actual frequency of price adjustment
applies strictly only in our two period setting. An extension to a more
general dynamic setting thus seems desirable. In some sense this extension21
should be straightforward; as the incentives for changing prices are bigger
for oligopolies, we should observe them changing their prices more often.
Unfortunately when considering dynamic games between duopolists one must
allow the strategies of the firms to depend on the history of their
relationship. This considerably complicates the analysis. In particular,
since price changes may precipitate price wars, there may be equilibria in
which duopolies are reluctant to change their prices.5
Another important area for future research is the interaction between
the two types of imperfections we consider; costs of changing prices and
costs of finding out information about costs. It would seem that a small
amount of costs of changing. prices is necessary to explain why firms do not
change their prices everytinie some public information about the economy is
released. What is conceivable is that costs of collecting information
exarcebate the reluctance to change prices. Such costs mean that the firm
will only occasionaly know its "optimal" price. Insofar as customers are
mainly upset about "unjustified" price changes, i.e. price changes which are
either not based on gooa information or which are reversed, the presence of
large search costs may prolong the duration of fixed prices.
5For some dynamic models that use a framework capable of addressing these
difficult questions see Gartner (1985) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1985).22
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